Negotiation strategy for continuous long-term tasks in a grid environment by Haberland, Valeriia et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1007/s10458-015-9316-2
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Haberland, V., Miles, S., & Luck, M. (2015). Negotiation strategy for continuous long-term tasks in a grid
environment. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems . 10.1007/s10458-015-9316-2
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Negotiation Strategy for Continuous Long-Term Tasks in a
Grid Environment
Valeriia Haberland · Simon Miles · Michael Luck
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract Nowadays, much research is concerned with execution of long-term continuous
tasks, which produce data in real time, e.g. monitoring applications. These tasks can be run
for months or years and they are usually resource intensive in terms of the large amounts of
data which is processed per time unit. A Grid can potentially provide the amount of resources
necessary to execute these tasks, but it might prove to be impossible or non-beneficial for a
Grid to allocate resources for such long durations as these resources can be also requested
by other clients or might join a Grid only for some periods of time. To resolve these dif-
ferences, a client and a Grid Resource Allocator negotiate, and a client has to agree for a
shorter execution period at the end of which it needs to negotiate again. In this paper, we
discuss in detail a decision-making mechanism for a client as part of its negotiation strategy,
which aims to increase the duration of execution periods and to decrease the duration of
interruptions. This new strategy, ConTask, has been tested on a realistic Grid resource sim-
ulator, and it demonstrates better utilities than our strategy which has not been specifically
designed for continuous tasks under various conditions.
Keywords Automated negotiation · Continuous task · Grid resources
1 Introduction
Many researchers focus on processing data streams, which are obtained from sensors. For
example, these data streams may monitor the level of air pollution [13], or the possibility of
earthquake [10]. The tasks which process these data streams produce data in real time and,
therefore, it is desirable for these tasks to be run continuously, but short interruptions might
be acceptable, i.e. they do not noticeably affect the success of task execution. A duration of
interruption is considered to be acceptable if significant changes are unlikely to occur during
this time, e.g. a substantial rise or drop in the temperature, leading to a loss of relevant
information for a client. It has to be noted that a client knowledge of the observed parameter
(e.g. temperature) becomes less realistic with time if task is interrupted, causing the client
utility to be decreased at higher rates. These tasks are often required to run for unspecified
or long periods of time, which can be months or years. In our work, we consider that these
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tasks are intended to run for specified long periods of time rather than uncertain periods of
time and they are considered to be continuous long-term tasks.
A continuous task, as discussed above, is appropriate to execute in a Grid [12], because
it potentially comprises more resources (e.g. CPUs) than any cluster or supercomputer. A
Grid generally follows a concept of non-commercial resource sharing1, which means that
resources can be allocated with no monetary cost for a client. However, a Grid can be ac-
cessible by any clients who wish to run their tasks and, therefore, the resource availability
may vary over time. Moreover, some resources may leave or join a Grid in future. In our
work, we assume that resource availability changes near-periodically over time mostly due
to the pseudo-periodicity in demand on resources. This assumption is realistic for some
Grids [4, 20], e.g. Iosup et al. [20] show some periodicity patterns in their illustration of
Grid resource utilisation as well as Andrzejak and Ceyran [4] demonstrate a periodicity in
CPU utilisation for some servers. For instance, Kondo et al. [21] discuss CPU utilisation
in desktop grids, which is generally larger during weekdays than weekends. Their study
also suggests that CPUs are on average unavailable 19% of the time during working days
and only 3% of the time during weekends, where availability means that a CPU should
have more than 1% of free capacity to perform a task. Hence, relative predictability of the
pseudo-deterministic changes in resource availability is utilised in our work to support near-
continuous tasks execution.
We assume that it is impossible or non-beneficial for a Grid to allocate resources for
the whole requested long durations of time, because long-term predictions of resource avail-
ability are generally unreliable for highly dynamic and open environments [3, 38] and these
resources can be also requested by other clients. In other words, a Grid might be unable
to guarantee task execution in the long-term future and, hence, unwilling to commit to its
execution. Therefore, a task is likely to be granted a shorter period of resource utilisation
than initially requested. Then, this task is interrupted at the end of this period and this inter-
ruption is considered to be planned. If a task has been interrupted, it has to request resources
from a Grid again. Frequently, negotiation is used to agree the requirements between clients’
and resource providers’ [30]. In our work, a negotiation is bilateral and it is initiated by a
client immediately after task’s interruption. A resource provider’s interests are represented
by a Grid Resource Allocator (GRA) and a client’s interests by a Client Agent, where both
are autonomous agents [37]. The abilities of autonomous agents to monitor continuously
the environment and respond actively to the dynamic changes in this environment are im-
portant for automated negotiation in such open environments as a Grid. The other relevant
agent’s ability is to communicate and decide on their actions without human commands,
which becomes crucial for the huge number of simultaneously negotiating agents.
In this paper, we present a client’s negotiation strategy, ConTask, which allows a client
to concede beyond the last best proposal of the GRA or its own proposal in order to start the
subsequent interruption period under favourable conditions for negotiation, i.e. closer to the
maximum of resource availability. This maximum is estimated to some degree, considering
pseudo-periodicity in resource availability fluctuations. It should be noted that the client is
unaware of resource availability fluctuations and estimates them based on the outcome of
negotiation, i.e. the agreed duration of task execution. The ConTask strategy also offers a
largely extended evaluation function, compared to [16], which is used to decide whether the
current and / or cumulative (all previous interruptions) durations of interruption are too long,
while the previous strategy [16] only considers a risk of resource exhaustion before the end
of negotiation. If at least one of those interruptions is too long, a client generally tends to be
1 We do not focus on commercial Grids.
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more generous in negotiation. This extended evaluation function leads to considerably better
utilities for a client than its previous version, which takes into account only the risk of re-
source exhaustion during negotiation. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses
related work, while Section 3 presents a formal model for a continuity of task execution and
negotiation for resources. Section 4 describes our ConTask negotiation strategy and Section
5 discusses the evaluation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Background
Research and industry currently face the issues of continuous or near-continuous task exe-
cution on plants or in robotics, air pollution monitoring, etc. For example, Castro et al. [9]
aim to find an optimal schedule of resource usage (e.g. equipment) on plants for continu-
ous processes (e.g. continuous feedstock mixing). Other research [2] addresses the issues of
continuous area monitoring by a group of robots in order to detect some events of interest
(e.g. gas leaks). The work of Chen et al. [10] proposes a Grid-based Adaptive Execution on
Streams (GATES) to process distributed data streams in a real-time manner. For instance,
this Grid system can be used to process tasks, which can predict large earthquakes based
on ground movements. Although all these researchers offer effective mathematical or algo-
rithmic solutions for their problem domains, they mostly focus on matching or scheduling
resource-task pairs. Hence, a client (an owner of a task) cannot effectively influence task
execution or affect possible interruptions of tasks.
A client can significantly influence task execution when its requirements can be negoti-
ated with the GRA, where both parties can utilise various strategies in order to follow their
objectives. Strategies which depend on time naturally reflect many real-life time-dependent
tasks. Many such strategies have been developed in much work [1, 7, 11, 24, 31], where an
amount of concession changes over time, considering usually an approaching negotiation
deadline. If this deadline is reached without agreement, then a negotiation terminates.
For example, Faratin et al. [11] propose several time-dependent strategies, where a ne-
gotiator significantly concedes closer to its negotiation deadline (greedy behaviour) or it
significantly concedes from the beginning of negotiation (generous behaviour). Lang [22]
also mentions a strategy when a negotiator concedes linearly over time, while Sim [29] in-
troduces a “waiting” strategy, where a negotiator concedes only at the deadline. Such work
not only focuses on time in their strategies, but also takes into account changing market
competition and opportunity (e.g. [1, 30, 31]), the behaviour of the negotiator’s opponent
(e.g. [1, 11, 18, 28]), and even strategies that do not depend on time [7].
In particular, Sim [30] describes a Market-Driven Agent (MDA) which considers time
and market-related pressure on a negotiator. In this strategy, the opportunity for a negotiator
is determined by the number of potential trading partners and the differences between their
and negotiator’s proposals in terms of their utilities. The competition pressure is determined
by the probability that a negotiator is chosen as the most preferable partner by at least one of
its trading partners in a particular negotiation round, and the pressure potentially increases
with the number of competitors. The time-related pressure on the MDA is similar to the
time-dependent tactics, presented by Faratin et al. [11], where a pressure on a negotiator
increases when a negotiation approaches the deadline, and a negotiator can adopt generous,
indifferent (linear) or greedy behaviour. Sim et al. [32, 33] also consider that a negotiator
is able to decrease its utility expectation when a pressure becomes high by accepting a
’slightly’ worse proposal from its opponent, where a quantitative estimate of ’slightly’ or
’not slightly’ is determined through a fuzzy logic mechanism. Although this work allows a
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negotiator to accept a smaller than expected utility, it does not take into account an effect
of such decision for future negotiations, which is essential for continuous long-term task
execution.
The MDA agent [30] has been extended in many other research papers. For instance, Ren
et al. [26] re-calculate the opportunity and competition factors by considering possible future
market changes, e.g. the probability of n trading partners joining the negotiation process
in the next round. Adabi et al. [1] state that it is important to consider a past concession
behaviour of the trading partners in order to punish or encourage an unfair or favourable
behaviour respectively. However, Adabi et al. assume that a negotiator (e.g. client) has an
access to the database which stores a concession history of its opponents, which may not
be available to a client. There are other negotiation strategies which consider an opponent’s
behaviour [11, 18, 19], and they range from imitating this behaviour [11] to learning the
opponent’s tactics [19] or preference profile [18], etc. However, those strategies do not focus
on learning the causes behind the opponent’s behavioural changes such as environmental
changes.
It has to be noted that if the end of negotiation is unspecified (no specific deadline), but
the duration of negotiation is relevant for client’s tasks, especially for continuous tasks, then
the mentioned above strategies do not account to this issue. They also do not consider the
cumulative effect of previous interruptions on the current negotiation, e.g. a more generous
client if a cumulative interruption is too long.
Some researchers focus on developing and improving a platform Generic Environment
for Negotiation with Intelligent multi-purpose Usage Simulation (GENIUS) [5, 6, 17] for
multi-issue negotiation simulation between heterogeneous agents. It has a user interface,
which allows a human user to choose the domain of negotiation, the negotiating agents with
their strategies, preferences, etc. This platform also allows integration of new negotiation
agents and it can compare an outcome of negotiation with some optimal outcomes such as a
Pareto efficient outcome. This platform is also used to perform tournaments among agents,
where the agents’ performance can be contested in the different scenarios. However, this
platform is not designed to simulate negotiation processes for continuous task execution,
where future negotiations (e.g. a client’s tactic) depend on the duration and success of pre-
vious negotiations, e.g. a too long cumulative interruption leads to more generous client’s
tactic.
It is generally desirable for a client to ensure that an agreement can be reached as
fast and with as good an outcome as possible. This can be achieved if a demand on re-
sources is not high and resources are genuinely available. Hence, it is beneficial for a client
to find out when resource availability is at its maximum, assuming pseudo-periodicity in
workload and resource availability over time, and to negotiate during this period. Much
work [8, 25, 34, 36, 38] focuses on predictions of Grid performance to improve scheduling
of tasks, but also usually emphasise the role of the GRA rather than client, which may not
have direct knowledge of resource availability in a Grid. For example, Wolski et al. [35, 36]
describe the Network Weather Service which produces the short-term predictions of meta-
computing resource performance, considering its network and computational characteris-
tics, in a distributed environment based on historical data. Nudd et al. [25] propose a toolset,
the Performance Analysis and Characterisation Environment, which allows application de-
velopers to predict and evaluate a performance of sophisticated applications (e.g. parallel
applications) at the different stages of their development and deployment. However, these
performance predictions involve a knowledge of performance characteristics of available
resources, which might not be accessible by a client.
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3 Formal model
In our work, we assume that each task can be interrupted one or more times during its
long-term execution. If a task has been interrupted, it must again request resources from
a Grid. However, if resources are scarce and demand on resources is high at the time of
interruption, then a client may keep negotiating with the GRA much longer than if resources
are available, which may significantly decrease client utility. This section provides a formal
model for continuous execution of a task, including a client’s utility, as well as negotiation
itself. Note that this formal model of continuous task execution has been presented in the
work of Haberland et al. [15].
3.1 Continuous task model
The start time of task execution tstr is when a client has submitted its first request for
resources to a Grid, while the end moment for the whole long-term duration of task execution
is tend. We assume that a client may have multiple tasks, but they all run independently.
In order to compare and average utilities over multiple tasks, we assume that each task
has the same global start tstr and end tend time. The total execution time for each task is
τ tot = tend − tstr .
Each task imay have several interruption(s) within τ tot, which are not simultaneous for
multiple tasks. Each adjoined pair
(
τ inti , τ
exe
i
)
l
of a single interruption τ inti,l and execution
τexei,l periods of time for continuous task i, where an interruption period precedes a corre-
sponding execution period, has its counter l = 1, 2, 3, ... within τ tot. Here, each τexei,l starts
at tstri,l and ends at t
end
i,l . Task interruption or execution at time t (i.e. when in progress) is
τ inti,l (t) or τ
exe
i,l (t) respectively, where t ∈
[
tstr, tend
]
.
We assume that a cumulative duration of interruption over time objectively reflects on
the success of the client’s strategy, because each interruption period might have lighter or
tougher conditions for negotiation (e.g. level of resource availability). We define a cumula-
tive duration of interruption τcumi,l =
∑l
k=1 τ
int
i,k as the sum of all interruption durations
from the first until the lth prior to the execution period τexei,l . A cumulative interruption of
a task at time t, when a task is inside an interruption period τ inti,l (t), is τ
cum
i,l (t), where
t ∈ [tstr, tend].
Client utility considers all interruption and execution periods for each task, where only
execution periods explicitly contribute to utility. We argue that the utility gained by a client
for each execution period τexei,l must be affected negatively to a varying degree by two fac-
tors: the duration of the preceding interruption τ inti,l , which shows how much successfully
a client negotiated for this execution period; the cumulative duration of interruption τcumi,l ,
which shows how much successfully a client generally negotiated for previous execution pe-
riods, including τexei,l . To derive client utility, we introduce an effectiveness function Ei,l (t)
which shows the success level of execution of task i as a process over time within each exe-
cution period τexei,l (t), assigning a value from the range [0, 1] to each point in time t. Figure
1 shows the effectiveness of task execution over time as alternating execution and interrup-
tion periods. The effectiveness function increases linearly when the task is running (during
τexei,l (t)) and does not change when the task is interrupted (during τ
int
i,l (t)). The length of
interruptions (single and cumulative) affects the values of the effectiveness function during
the following execution period (e.g. Ei,l=2
(
tstri,l=2
)
< Ei,l=1
(
tendi,l=1
)
).
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Fig. 1 An effectiveness of continuous task execution over time
The level of impact of the length of interruption on the following execution period is
calculated with damping functions SI
(
τ inti,l
)
and CI
(
τcumi,l
)
for a single and cumulative
interruptions respectively. These functions have a form of broadened step functions and they
produce values from the interval [0, 1] where 1 denotes no impact. The values of these func-
tions decrease during the interruption period from 1 towards 0. Each of these functions has
two variables which define how fast the possible increment of the client utility for a par-
ticular execution period decreases towards zero, depending on the duration of interruption
period. They are (τmaxint , int) for a single interruption, while (τ
max
cum , cum) for a cumula-
tive interruption. Specifically, the variables τmaxint or τ
max
cum denote the durations of single or
cumulative interruptions after which the corresponding functions’ values decrease by half
compared to their maximal value, which is considered to be a substantial level of impact for
a client. The variables int or cum determine the speed of decrease in the corresponding
increment of the client’s utility, caused by interruption, and this speed increases closer to the
end of period τmaxint or τ
max
cum . For example, a continuous task which monitors temperature in
the building has been interrupted. The temperature will not rapidly change, but our knowl-
edge about its value becomes more and more unrealistic when time passes, and therefore
it should more significantly affect the effectiveness of task execution. These functions are
presented below:
SI
(
τ inti,l
)
=
1
e(τ
int
i,l −τmaxint )/int + 1
. (1)
CI
(
τcumi,l
)
=
1
e(τ
cum
i,l −τmaxcum )/cum + 1
. (2)
Here, if τ inti,l  τmaxint , then the value of SI
(
τ inti,l
)
is close to one. If τ inti,l  τmaxint , then
the value of SI
(
τ inti,l
)
is close to zero. The smaller the value of SI
(
τ inti,l
)
or CI
(
τcumi,l
)
,
the less effective task execution becomes in future.
The effectiveness function Ei,l (t) increases in the range from the level of effectiveness
Ei,l−1
(
tendi,l−1
)
, achieved by a task before interruption τ inti,l at time t
end
i,l−1, multiplied by the
values of functions SI
(
τ inti,l
)
and CI
(
τcumi,l
)
, towards the largest possible effectiveness 1
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at time tend in the time interval τexei,l , as below if j ≡ l − 1:
Ei,l (t) =

[(
1− Ei,j
(
tendi,j
))
t+ Ei,j
(
tendi,j
)
tend − tstri,l
tend − tstri,l
]
×
SI
(
τ inti,l
)
× CI (τcumi,l ) , if t ∈ τexei,l ,
Ei,j
(
tendi,j
)
, if t ∈ τ inti,l .
(3)
Here, if t = tstri,l , then the effectiveness of task executionEi,l (t) = Ei,j
(
tendi,j
)×SI (τ inti,l )×
CI
(
τcumi,l
)
, which means that the effectiveness function at the beginning of execution pe-
riod τexei,l corresponds to its value at the end of previous execution τ
exe
i,j , and it is affected
by the durations of interruptions. If t = tend, then the effectiveness of task execution
Ei,l (t) = SI
(
τ inti,l
) × CI (τcumi,l ). Consequently, if task execution reaches its deadline
tend with interruptions, then the effectiveness of task execution will not be equal to its
largest possible value, i.e. 1.
Client utility Ui for a task i is the sum of all areas under the effectiveness function
for the execution periods in proportion to the maximum possible area when the task is run
without interruptions during τ tot, and is shown in Figure 1 as the area of ‘ABC’. This utility
is presented in Equation (4).
Ui =
1
τ tot
Li∑
l=1
(
Ei,l
(
tstri,l
)
+ Ei,l
(
tendi,l
))
× τexei,l , (4)
where Li is the total number of interruption-execution pairs within τ tot for task i. The
average utility Uaver = 1/N
∑N
i=1 Ui is calculated as an average of utilities for N tasks,
and used in our evaluation.
3.2 Negotiation model
In this work, a polynomial function, presented by Faratin et al. [11] has been chosen as a
basic negotiation strategy for a client, because it allows a client to concede faster at the be-
ginning of negotiation as compared to an exponential function for conceding tactics. This
distinction between a polynomial and exponential functions is crucial for a client, because
a client becomes generous in negotiation when there is a risk of resource exhaustion. In the
cases of client’s greedy behaviour, a polynomial function produces much smaller values at
the beginning of negotiation than an exponential function which would preserve the client
utility, and this function also allows a client to wait shorter time before start conceding sub-
stantially which might prevent negotiation failure. While the work of Faratin et al. tested
different time-dependent strategies, the number of possible tactics in their experimental set-
tings was finite, which limits a choice for a client. Our ConTask negotiation strategy not
only assumes the infinite number of tactics, but the choice of those tactics is determined
through a sophisticated mechanism at every negotiation round, which takes into consid-
eration task-specific characteristics (e.g. continuity) and dynamics of Grid environment as
discussed further in this paper.
A client and GRA negotiate using an adopted alternating proposals protocol [27], where
the parties send proposals in turns, and both can accept the opponent’s proposal or quit a
negotiation process. In our work, a client has to negotiate with the GRA until resources are
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obtained which leads to uncertainty in respect of the final deadline of negotiation. However,
a negotiation process is time-dependent in terms of the length of interruption. Therefore, we
utilise time-dependent strategies [11] with reasonably short deadlines by the end of which
a client should not lose significant utility, and a client repeats these short negotiations until
an agreement is reached. In particular, short negotiations are defined in our experimental
settings further in this paper. In an ideal scenario, a client should be able to reach agreement
during a single short negotiation. Agreement is reached when a client accepts the GRA’s
proposal, or the GRA accepts a client’s proposal after it has been confirmed as the final one
by a client.
In each short negotiation, a negotiator concedes towards its opponent, starting from an
optimal length of task execution2 τCOpi,l for a client and a minimum length τ
GMn
i,k for the
GRA, where the client’s optimal value can change at the beginning of each interruption pe-
riod, but the GRA’s minimum can change at the beginning of each short negotiation (k is
the counter of short negotiations). A negotiation proceeds towards the negotiators’ reserva-
tion values, i.e. the minimum acceptable length of task execution τCMni,l for a client and the
maximum available length τGMxi,r for the GRA, which can change every next r negotiation
round. The GRA varies its reservation value in order to reflect on the changes in resource
availability, e.g. if resources become less available, its reservation value decreases. A short
negotiation stops when the negotiators reach agreement, one of them quits (e.g. the GRA if
resources are exhausted) or the short negotiation deadline tdl is reached. The level of con-
cession depends on the greediness βCi,r for the client and β
G
i,r for the GRA. If a proposal
from a client is τCi,r for task i at round r, and the proposal from the GRA is τ
G
i,r , then:
τCi,r = τ
COp
i,l +
(
r ×∆t
tdl
)βCi,r
×
(
τCMni,l − τCOpi,l
)
, (5)
τGi,r = τ
GMn
i,k +
(
r ×∆t
tdl
)βGi,r
×
(
τGMxi,r − τGMni,k
)
, (6)
where ∆t is equal to one conventional time unit. Note that τGMxi,r increases or decreases
proportionally to the level of resource availability. In these equations, when r = 0, then
τCi,r = τ
COp
i,l and τ
G
i,r = τ
GMn
i,k . When r×∆t = tdl, then τCi,r = τCMni,l and τGi,r = τGMxi,r .
The level of greediness for both negotiators changes, according to three tactics [11, 22]:
greedy (βC,Gi,r > 1), generous (0 < β
C,G
i,r < 1) or indifferent (β
C,G
i,r = 1).
The GRA’s level of greediness is based on the change in its reservation value and the de-
mand on resources, e.g. if demand is high and reservation value decreases, then it becomes
more greedy. The client’s level of greediness is estimated according to our extended evalu-
ation function, discussed in this paper, which controls a composition of fuzzy sets [14, 16].
A fuzzy set A is a subset of Y where each element y ∈ Y is mapped to the value from
the interval [0, 1], which determines the degree of membership of y in A, defined by the
membership function µA (y) [23, 39]. Each fuzzy set has a range of values of y ∈ Y which
have a non-zero membership. For example, a decrease in the level of greediness for a client
between 50% and 100% of its previous value can be considered as a substantial one with
the different or same levels of certainty for the different values from this range. In this work,
those ranges for the number of fuzzy sets are determined based on the extended evaluation
function, presented in this paper.
2 Note, “C” denotes a client and “G” denotes the GRA, while “Op”, “Mn” and “Mx” denote an optimal,
minimum and maximum length of time in the upper index of the notations, presented in this section.
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This evaluation function shows the level of attractiveness of a specific level of greedi-
ness, produced by a fuzzy logic mechanism, for a client at each negotiation round, consid-
ering different factors such as the risk of resource exhaustion. The ranges of fuzzy sets are
varied and their combinations constitute different compositions of fuzzy sets, which pro-
duce different levels of greediness for a client. In this paper, a client also chooses to concede
beyond the best last proposal from the GRA (or beyond its own non-confirmed last pro-
posal accepted by the GRA) in a short negotiation to start the next interruption period at
approximately maximum resource availability.
4 Negotiation strategy
The goal of our ConTask negotiation strategy for a client is to reduce the length of interrup-
tion periods and increase the length of execution periods, while not losing significantly in
utility3. As long as resource availability is assumed to change pseudo-periodically [4, 20],
then the reservation value of the GRA fluctuates periodically as well. A client is unaware
of resource availability or demand on resources, but higher demand generally leads to more
scarce resources. Resource scarcity leads to a less generous GRA with a smaller reserva-
tion value. As a result, it is likely that a task is allocated a shorter execution period when
resources are scarce. Hence, a client can determine which time interval is unfavourable for
negotiation and which is not based on the durations of agreed execution periods. That is,
the longer an allocated execution period is as a result of negotiation, the more favourable
this negotiation interval. Therefore, a client can estimate when the resource availability will
be at maximum, and aim to negotiate during this time (see Subsection 4.1). A client esti-
mates it through preliminary short negotiations with the GRA within some period before
tstr , which is not noticeable to the GRA as those negotiations follow the same rules as any
negotiations after tstr . Here, the accuracy of locating this maximum depends on the length
of this period, the amount of statistics and / or the level of determinism in the GRA’s reser-
vation value fluctuations (i.e. those fluctuations might have large or smaller oscillations over
time). Therefore, a client may need another technique, except negotiating at the maximum
resource availability, in order to reduce the durations of interruptions. We offer an extended
evaluation function, which allows a client to become more generous in negotiation when
single or cumulative interruptions are too long (see Subsection 4.2).
4.1 Negotiating at maximum resource availability
A client generally aims to obtain a longer execution period during negotiation. Convention-
ally, an agreement is reached when the negotiator’s utility for the opponent’s offer is higher
than for the next possible negotiator’s offer. In our work, a client does not always accept a
proposal which leads to a better utility than its own next proposal, but may decide to con-
cede more by proposing a shorter execution period to the GRA if this shortened period ends
closer to the maximum resource availability. This decision is mostly connected with the
continuity of task execution, because a client tries not only to obtain a better outcome in the
current negotiation, but must improve the overall effectiveness of task execution by reducing
all possible interruptions within τ tot, i.e. one successful negotiation affects any following
one in terms of the initial conditions such as resource availability, etc.
3 Note, the ideas of this strategy have been very briefly discussed in a short paper [15].
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Fig. 2 A decision to shorten an execution period τexe
′
i,l
Here, we define the best offered execution period τexe
′
i,l as the last proposal of the GRA
or a client, which is to be accepted by a client or which is already accepted by the GRA
(not confirmed by a client) [15]. That is, it is a proposal that should conventionally seal an
agreement between negotiators. However, a client may decide to ask for a shorter execution
period τexei,l in order for this period to end around the maximum of resource availability. It
also has to be noted that a client attempts to reduce the length of τexe
′
i,l only as much as to
reach the closest maximum from the end of this execution period.
Assume the length of time on which a client shortens its execution period is∆τ . The ex-
pected end time of τexe
′
i,l is t
end′
i,l . The shortened execution period τ
exe
i,l must end around the
maximum resource availability as in Figure 24. A client tries to choose as short as possible
∆τ to lose as little utility as possible. Assume that an estimated period of a pseudo-periodic
resource availability fluctuations is Pest, while an estimated time interval between tstr and
the first maximum of resource availability is τest. Both values are derived from accumulated
statistics of average execution periods per time interval (e.g. per half hour) during prelimi-
nary short negotiations. Note that if the execution period τexe
′
i,l does not contain at least one
maximum of resource availability, a client does not shorten it because τexei,l < 0. If the end
of τexe
′
i,l is already in the maximum, ∆τ = 0. That is, ∆τ is calculated as follows:
∆τ =
(
tend
′
i,l − tstr
)
− (τest + Pest × n) , (7)
where n is the number of the corresponding periods Pest until the estimated maximum
resource availability, where the execution period would be expected to end if it becomes
shorter. Consequently, the shortened execution period is τexei,l = τ
exe′
i,l − ∆τ , while its
expected end time of τexei,l is t
end
i,l . The algorithm to shorten the best offered execution
period is presented below.
4 The figure shows a strongly periodic dependence for average execution periods over time only as an
example.
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Algorithm 1 Client algorithm to shorten τexe
′
i,l
1: {One negotiator offers τexe′i,l , but there is no agreement yet}
2: Calculate ∆τ (see Formula (7))
3: if∆τ < τexe
′
i,l then
4: Calculate τexei,l = τ
exe′
i,l −∆τ
5: Calculate tendi,l = t
end′
i,l −∆τ {The end time is re-calculated to start the next interruption period at
the correct point in time}
6: Send a new proposal of τexei,l to the GRA
7: Respond to the request of confirmation to the GRA {Agreement for τexei,l }
8: else
9: Accept execution period τexe
′
i,l {Agreement for τexe
′
i,l }
10: end if
4.2 Considering the duration of interruptions
The damping functions SI (·) and CI (·) in Equations (1), (2) determine how much the
length of single and cumulative interruptions affect the effectiveness of task execution, and
as a result client’s utility. The values of SI
(
τ inti,l (t)
)
and CI
(
τacci,l (t)
)
can be calculated
at point in time t during task’s interruption τ inti,l (t) to ensure that their values have not sub-
stantially dropped towards zero. Assume that a client determines the sensitivity thresholds
χint and χcum with respect to a single and cumulative interruptions respectively. When
the difference between the value of any damping function and its largest possible value 1 at
time t becomes larger than χint for SI
(
τ inti,l (t)
)
and/or χcum for CI
(
τcumi,l (t)
)
, a client
infers that the interruption is too long. An interruption is too long if it significantly affects
the client’s utility.
Formally, χint or χcum denotes the difference between the largest possible value 1 of
the corresponding damping function (no impact on client utility) and the values of these
functions when the durations of the current single τ inti,l (t) and/or cumulative τ
cum
i,l (t) in-
terruptions exceed the durations τmaxint − m × int and τmaxcum − k × cum, as shown in
Equations (8), (9).
χint = 1− SI (τmaxint −m× int) , (8)
χcum = 1− CI (τmaxcum − k × cum) , (9)
where the non-dimensional coefficientsm, k ∈ R denote the amount of the values of int or
cum which are deducted from τmaxint or τ
max
cum to indicate the start of the time range where
the client utility is significantly affected. Considering χint and χcum are chosen by a client,
we can calculate the value ofm from Equations (1) and (8) as in Equation (10) and similarly
the value of k from Equations (2) and (9) as in Equation (11).
m = ln
((
1− χint
)
/χint
)
, (10)
k = ln ((1− χcum) /χcum) . (11)
Here, we describe our additional criteria C1i,l (t) and C
2
i,l (t) for our extended evaluation
function, compared to this function in [16]. The previous version of this function consists
of only one criterion Ci,r for a client to become more generous, when the risk of resource
exhaustion in round r for task i is high before the end of negotiation. This criterion is esti-
mated as Ci,r =
∑r
k=1 αi,k + r × ∆t/tdl, where αi,k is a relative change of the GRA’s
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reservation value in respect of the difference of its initial reservation value and its initial
offer to a client at the beginning of short negotiation. This criterion Ci,r < 0, if resource
availability mostly decreases with an average speed
∣∣1/r∑rk=1 αi,k∣∣ > ∆t/tdl, which
means that resources might become exhausted before the end of negotiation. The new cri-
teria C1i,l (t) and C
2
i,l (t), described in this paper, solve the distinct problem of prolonged
interruption durations. Consequently, C1i,l (t) denotes whether the length of the current sin-
gle interruption is in the time range where the utility is significantly affected by its duration,
i.e. τ inti,l (t) > τ
max
int −m×int, while C2i,l (t) has the same idea for the current cumulative
interruption, and they are presented below:
C1i,l (t) = (τ
max
int −m× int)− τ inti,l (t) , (12)
C2i,l (t) = (τ
max
cum − k × cum)− τcumi,l (t) . (13)
Our evaluation function Qi,r,l (rx, t), which is calculated at every point in time t (negoti-
ation round) for the different levels of client greediness, which lead to different rounds rx
of expected agreements. The maximum of this function for the different expected rx indi-
cates the smallest or largest level of greediness among all levels, produced by the different
fuzzy sets’ combinations [16]. Therefore, this function consists of the two summands, where
only one summand at time t can have a non-zero value: if rx × ∆t/tdl is maximised for
the different expected rx, the longest negotiation is chosen (the largest level of greediness);
if (tdl − rx ×∆t) /tdl is maximised, then the shortest negotiation is chosen (the smallest
greediness) within a negotiation deadline tdl. A zero or non-zero value of a summand is
determined by the Heaviside step functions θ (·) with criteria as their arguments. For exam-
ple, if C1i,l (t) < 0, then θ
(
C1i,l (t)
)
= 0 and if C1i,l (t) ≥ 0, then θ
(
C1i,l (t)
)
= 1. Our
extended evaluation function is below.
Qi,r,l (rx, t) =
(
rx ×∆t
tdl
)
θ (Ci,r) θ
(
C1i,l (t)
)
θ
(
C2i,l (t)
)
+
+
(
tdl − rx ×∆t
tdl
)(
1− θ (Ci,r) θ
(
C1i,l (t)
)
θ
(
C2i,l (t)
))
.
(14)
Here, the maximised value of this function over the different combinations of fuzzy sets
indicates the largest level of greediness only if Ci,r ≥ 0, C1i,l (t) ≥ 0 and C2i,l (t) ≥ 0. If
at least one criterion is negative, at least one criterion is unfavourable for negotiation, and
then a client tends to concede more generously. The flexibility of this evaluation function in
terms of adding new criteria for a client to take into account is clear when the new criteria
are embedded.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate improvements in client utility compared to our previous negotiation strategy
[16], while applying the ConTask negotiation strategy in realistic settings for different Grid
environment conditions, reflected in the GRA’s reservation value, which changes pseudo-
periodically, following changes in resource availability. The GRA’s reservation value has
also random deviations, which are generated with the normal distribution, representing the
more or less predictable GRA’s behaviour. As long as deviations in the GRA’s reservation
value may significantly affect negotiation, we consider them important. That is, we compare
client utilities for cases when the standard deviation of the GRA’s reservation value can
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be 1, 5, 10, 20 and 50 % of the client’s optimal value. Larger deviations also cause larger
uncertainty for a client in terms of identifying a favourable time interval for negotiation.
We also assume that each short negotiation takes a maximum 100 rounds, equivalent
to 100 conventional seconds (but these negotiations may repeat until agreement is reached
between a client and the GRA). In our model, all time units are modelled in conventional
units, not real time. The duration of execution can be up to 10 days as a result of negotiation,
while the total execution period τ tot for each task is equal to 1 conventional year. The period
of the change in the GRA’s reservation value is considered to be 24 conventional hours.
Client utilities are averaged for 100 tasks, assumed to be executed independently. The
variables for the functions SI (·) and CI (·) are considered to be τmaxint = 100.0, τmaxcum =
4800.0, int = 30.0 and cum = 2000.0 conventional seconds. These variables are chosen
experimentally, and they generally aim not to significantly affect utility, if a client negotiates
successfully during 100 rounds without negotiation repetitions. More repetitions and, as a
result, longer interruption periods, affect client utility more significantly.
5.1 Model of resource dynamism
Here, we describe the main principles of our Grid resource dynamism model, which are
based on real-life observation of resource utilisation in a Grid, presented in the paper of
Iosup et al. [20]. We have identified several pseudo-periodic patterns of resource utilisation
fluctuation over time, which are used in this model. Some Grids show a pseudo-periodicity
in resource consumption over the days, where period is approximately equal to one day.
Although some Grids demonstrate approximately equal peaks of resource consumption ev-
ery day, others generally show the smaller peaks for the beginning and the end of the week.
Some Grids generally show the repetitions in resource utilisation over the days of each week,
which we consider as a pseudo-periodicity over the weeks. For example, the resource con-
sumption is generally smaller at the beginning of the week and at the weekends than during
the working days. However, some weeks are less distinctive from each other, that is the re-
source consumption does not drop significantly during the weekends. Some of Grids also do
not demonstrate a pseudo-periodic resource utilisation, but they are out of the scope of our
research.
Our model is implemented as a simulator, which calculates the amount of free Nf (t)
and busy Nb (t) resources, the total amount of resources Ntot (t) and the accumulated
amount of demanded resources Nd (t) at each time step. This simulator allows us to test the
ConTask negotiation strategy for the different scenarios. Figure 3 shows three conventional
weeks of resource dynamism simulation, where the total amount of resources is equal to the
sum of free and busy resources. In this figure, some days or weeks periodicities in resource
consumption are less distinctive than others. For example, the amount of busy resources
does not decrease substantially for the weekends between the first and the second weeks
(i.e. in the time interval of [120, 168] hours), but it decreases more deterministically for the
weekends between the second and the third weeks (i.e. in the time interval of [228, 336]
hours). The total amount of resources also changes over time as resources can join or leave
a Grid, or fail. The larger resource scarcity is modelled for the cases when the demand on
resources increases and / or the total resource amount decreases. Note that the demand on
resources Nd (t), depicted in this figure, shows the accumulated amount of requested re-
sources at each time step which has not been allocated yet. In the cases, when the value of
Nd (t) close to zero means that there are almost no outstanding resource requests, but it does
not mean that there are no new resource requests which is discussed later in this section. In
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Fig. 3 A demonstration of resource dynamism simulation
order to calculate the amount of free and busy resources as well as the demand on resources
at any time point, the system of differential equations is solved numerically:
dNf (t)
dt
= −α×Nd (t)×Nf (t) + β ×Nb (t) + µ (t)× dNtot (t)
dt
,
dNd (t)
dt
= −α×Nd (t)×Nf (t) + γ (t)− υ (t)× dNtot (t)
dt
,
Ntot (t) = Nb (t) +Nf (t) ,
(15)
where α×Nd (t)×Nf (t) or β×Nb (t) are the amounts of resources which become busy or
free during an arbitrary small time unit, and α (1/[time unit]*[resource unit]) and β (1/[time
unit]) are experimentally chosen coefficients.
The change in the total amount of resources Ntot (t) also affects the amount of free and
busy resources and, as a result, the accumulated amount of requested resources. Fluctuation
of Ntot (t) over time is simulated using different random superpositions of step-type func-
tions. Here, µ (t) or υ (t) denote the portion of change in the total resource amount for an
arbitrary small time unit which are free or busy resources respectively, and µ (t)+υ (t) = 1.
When the total resource amount increases dNtot (t) /dt > 0, then υ (t) = 0 and µ (t) = 1,
i.e. the amount of Ntot (t) increases only as a result of additional free resources joining a
Grid. When the total resource amount decreases dNtot (t) /dt < 0, then υ (t) ∈ [0, 1] and
µ (t) ∈ [0, 1], i.e. the amount of Ntot (t) decreases in respect of free and busy resources as
a result of resource failure and / or withdrawal from a Grid.
The accumulated amount of requested resources Nd (t) also depends on the newly re-
quested resource amounts γ (t) per time unit, which exhibit periodic dependencies discussed
at the beginning of this section. It is assumed that there are more resource requests during
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working days than at the weekends, and during the normal working hours than at night.
Those periodicities are presented below:
γ (t) = γ0
(
1− γ1 × sin
(
2pit
Tdyn
))d1
×
(
γ2 +
∣∣∣∣sin( 2pit14× Tdyn
)∣∣∣∣d2
)
, (16)
where γ0, γ1 and γ2 are experimentally chosen constants, i.e. γ0 = 11 ([resource unit]/[time
unit]), γ1 = 0.9 and γ2 = 0.1; Tdyn is the period of a sine-type wave and is equal to
24 virtual hours; d1 and d2 ∈ [0, 1] are the degrees which define the level of distinction
between the peaks of newly requested resource amounts over days and weeks, and t is
the current time. The first factor of γ (t) models the periodicity in the requested resource
amounts over days, while the second factor models the periodicity over weeks. The degrees
d1 and d2 can be re-calculated randomly in the interval [0, 1] once every 24 virtual hours.
The smaller their values, the less distinctive peaks are in resource utilisation over days and
weeks. For example, the same level of resource utilisation can be observed for two days
without distinctive peaks for each day.
The GRA’s reservation value τGMxi,r changes proportionally to the amount of free re-
sources Nf (t) with random deviations above mentioned, while the GRA’s level of greedi-
ness βGi,r changes, depending on the change in the GRA’s reservation value and the demand
on resources Nd (t) as discussed in Section 3.2.
5.2 Evaluation results
Here, we evaluate each of the contributions of the ConTask negotiation strategy separately
and together. In Figure 4, we compare utilities for continuous task execution when a client
shortens the best offered execution period “wShort” or a negotiation finishes in a traditional
way “noShort”, as explained in Subsection 4.1. In the case of “noShort”, our previous nego-
tiation strategy [16] is used by a client, where the evaluation function has only one criterion
Ci,r (see Subsection 4.2). The results show that the shortening algorithm improves client
utility for all GRA reservation value deviations. However, the difference between utilities in
“wShort” and “noShort” becomes gradually smaller towards larger intervals of deviations,
due to the increasing uncertainty in estimations of maximum resource availability when the
GRA’s reservation value has significant oscillations. All utilities decrease towards the higher
deviation intervals, because the higher level of deviation of the GRA’s reservation value de-
notes that resources may be exhausted during one or few negotiation rounds when a client
has no time to adapt to the resource availability changes.
These results are explained in Figure 5, which shows the execution periods averaged
over 100 tasks per half an hour for one day for the different deviation intervals of the GRA’s
reservation value, where the standard deviation is chosen to be 1% (i.e. “AverExec 1”), 5%,
10%, 20% and 50% of the client’s optimal value. As depicted in this figure, smaller devia-
tions (e.g. “AverExec 1” and “AverExec 5”) lead to more accurate estimation of maximum
resource availability based on the average execution periods, where this maximum is more
distinctive than for larger deviations. However, the longest execution periods around the
minimum of resource availability are shown for the largest deviation (i.e. “AverExec 50”),
which is due to the drastic increases and decreases in the GRA’s reservation value and, as
a result, in the durations of allocated time slots of resource utilisation for each task. Con-
sequently, the execution periods on average at the minimum resource availability become
almost equal to their values at the maximum of resource availability.
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Fig. 6 Evaluation of the client’s extended evaluation function
In Figure 6, we compare utilities for our extended evaluation function Qi,r,l (rx, t)
(i.e. “wEval”) with utilities for the case “noShort”. We also evaluate the results for dif-
ferent levels of sensitivity χint = χtot (see Subsection 4.2), imposed by a client. In this
case, we have chosen 0.1 (“noShort&wEval 0.1”), 0.2 (“noShort&wEval 0.2”) and 0.5
(“noShort&wEval 0.5”) for evaluation, because 0.1 represents a mostly generous client,
while 0.5 represents a mostly greedy client in negotiation (a client becomes more gener-
ous only after the inflection points τmaxint and τ
max
cum ). Consequently, 0.2 is chosen as some
“medium” level of sensitivity between 0.1 and 0.5.
Figure 6 shows that the smallest utility in all cases is when a client uses our previous
non-extended evaluation function “noShort” [16], which does not consider the durations
of single and total interruptions. This figure also demonstrates that the smaller sensitivity
thresholds, e.g. 0.1, lead to the higher utilities than the larger thresholds. In the cases of the
larger sensitivity thresholds, clients greediness leads to longer interruptions when a client
does not necessarily negotiate at the maximum resource availability and, as a result, the
smaller utilities. It has to be noted that the difference between utilities for all cases decreases
with the larger intervals of deviation. This can be explained that the large deviations may as
much increase interruption or execution periods at any resource availability as decrease it,
because of drastic random increases or decreases in the GRAs reservation value. As a result,
the choice of the sensitivity threshold less affects the outcome of negotiation.
However, the durations of interruptions on average for the larger deviations are longer
when resources are more scarce, as depicted in Figure 7 (e.g. for the cases with standard de-
viation 5% (“AvrInt 5”) and 50% (“AvrInt 50”)). This tendency is due to the large negative
deviations in the GRA’s reservation value which lead to negotiation failures. Note that the
average interruptions for the larger deviations around the maximum of resource availability
are in turn shorter than for the smaller deviations due to the large negative deviations which
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Fig. 7 The average interruption periods during one day, corresponding to the average execution periods in
Figure 5
might be perceived by a client as a risk of resource exhaustion and lead to more generous
tactics, finishing negotiation earlier. It has to be remembered that the maximal duration of
a single negotiation is 100 seconds in our experiment, i.e. if the duration of interruption
is close to 100 seconds, it means that the majority of negotiations are successful at first
attempt. The average interruption durations for the case “AvrInt 50” at the maximum of
resource availability are longer than for the case “AvrInt 20”, which just shows an unpre-
dictable nature of the GRA’s behaviour in the case “AvrInt 50”. That is, the large negative
or positive deviations may lead to either too generous (shorter negotiation) or too greedy
(longer negotiation) client’s behaviour respectively, averaging closer to the maximal possi-
ble duration of negotiation.
In Figure 8, we compare our ConTask negotiation strategy that uses both the shorten-
ing algorithm and an extended evaluation function (“wShort&wEval”) to the case when we
do not use any of these contributions “noShort”, and generally to all other figures. Here,
all utilities are larger than for each separate contribution, as in Figures 4 and 6. It is also
important to indicate that the sensitivity threshold 0.2 shows the best utilities for all con-
sidered deviations of the GRAs reservation value, which is different to the best sensitivity
threshold presented in Figure 6. A less generous client’s behaviour (sensitivity 0.2) becomes
more beneficial when each negotiation is likely to start at the maximum of resource avail-
ability, while more generous client’s behaviour is beneficial when each negotiation is likely
to proceed under unfavourable conditions.
Here, the sensitivity 0.5 leads to the better utilities than 0.1, when the standard deviations
are 5%, 10% and 20%, but it shows the worse utilities than 0.1, when the standard deviations
are 1% and 50%. It means that a substantial greediness is better than a substantial generosity
for almost all deviations, except for the extremely small or large deviations, but it is worse
Negotiation Strategy for Continuous Long-Term Tasks in a Grid Environment 19
0.00E+00
2.00E-04
4.00E-04
6.00E-04
8.00E-04
1.00E-03
1.20E-03
1 5 10 20 50
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 c
li
e
n
t 
u
ti
li
ty
Standard deviation of the GRA's reservation value 
wShort&wEval_0.1
wShort&wEval_0.2
wShort&wEval_0.5
noShort
Fig. 8 Evaluation of the whole ConTask negotiation strategy
than a moderate generosity 0.2. In the case of extremely small deviations a greedy client
loses in utility in terms of the duration of negotiation for no larger outcome, and in the case
of extremely large deviations a greedy client loses in utility, because it is difficult to reach an
agreement. A conclusion is that a substantial generosity might be more beneficial for the ex-
treme small or large deviations of the GRA’s reservation value, compared to the substantial
greediness, while a moderate generosity is better for all cases in general. However, an opti-
mal generosity cannot be chosen precisely and it has to be derived through experimentation
for the different Grid environment settings, which can be our further direction of research.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we described in detail a new negotiation strategy, ConTask, that allows near-
continuous task execution by increasing the durations of execution without interruptions
and by reducing the interruptions as well. Our strategy offers a different way of reaching
agreement where a client may concede beyond the proposal which would be accepted in a
traditional negotiation in order to negotiate around the maximum of resource availability. A
client also takes into account the durations of the single and cumulative interruptions within
the long period of task execution to change its negotiation tactic.
As a result, our negotiation strategy shows an improvement in client utility for differ-
ent scenarios within a realistically modelled Grid environment, where resource availability
changes near-periodically over time. The evaluation results also demonstrate that an ex-
tremely generous client’s behaviour is more beneficial for the cases when it may not nego-
tiate at the maximum resource availability. A moderately generous behaviour for a client is
generally beneficial for the different Grid environments, when a client considers the shorter
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execution periods in order to negotiate closer to the maximum of resource availability. It
has to be noted that the larger deviations of the GRA’s reservation values may lead to the
shorter interruptions due to the possible large positive deviations. However, the larger devia-
tions also denote a less predictable Grid’s behaviour, which generally leads to smaller client
utilities for all strategies.
In our future work, we plan to focus on continuous long-term task execution, consid-
ering the dependencies among them in terms of input data streams. In such scenario, an
interruption of one task would not just affect its own utility, but also the utilities of other
tasks, imposing more time constraints on negotiation process and increasing a complexity
of decision-making for a client.
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